Virtual Explosion: warfare, intelligence, and operational security concerns over the blogosphere

Arguably, the greatest challenge that any global corporation with a 1-million person interchangeable and mobile workforce operating in a highly volatile market can face is that of communication. Throw in a rigid hierarchical culture and an uncompromising need for security and secrecy and you get the problems faced by all military members.

Indeed, it was these security and secrecy issues that made me hesitant to even begin this blog. Given that these concerns are still so evident within the online military community, I was not surprised to find very little training discussions taking place in public forums. Most of the easily available 'military' blogs, similar to the one pictured to the left, are highly-charged emotional journals belonging to deployed service members.

Thus was the status-quo when I dawned my virtual battle-rattle and trekked into the blogosphere looking for valid training discussions. Ironically, I discovered that one of the loudest and continuous debates going on in the military blogosphere is about the use of that same blogosphere (call it social media, web 2.0 or whatever seems most appropriate) in military training, public relations, and operations. Currently, there are only a few web 2.0 communities within the internet designed for professional military members to discuss operations and training issues. Pictured further below is a website originally founded by 4 West Point graduates. It is designed with the intent of providing company commanders (leaders of 200-300 man elements) a forum in which they can share experiences and advice.

Though I read through many, many blogs, I chose to comment on two. (These comments are posted below for convenience, but can also be read on the blogs themselves by clicking here and here).

The first blog, Intel 2.o, is the official blog for a social media research company. As far as I can tell, it is authored by the company founder Guy Hagen. Both Mr. Hagen and his company boast impressive credentials. I chose this blog for its level of professionalism and expertise as well as the fact that it was vague enough to cultivate questions.

The second blog I chose to comment on is from a less reputable, though still valid and intriguing, source. The author of 'Jesserwilson's Weblog' claims to be a dedicated government employee in his mid-twenties. Though he lacks viable credentials, he links his posts to good resources and demonstrates a high quality of language, rhetoric, and subject matter knowledge within his posts. I chose to comment on this blog because his arguments were professional and, as such, invited open and friendly debate.

My comment on Intel 2.0 post entitled "Military Social Media Intelligence."

First of all, I’d like to compliment not only the content of this blog but also extend admiration of the scope and depth of the services Innovation Insight provides. I am a student at the University of Southern California and am in the process of composing a blog dedicated solely to the discussion of contemporary trends in military training. Your blog interests me because it touches on some major concerns that have resulted out of both the current war as well as the virtual (no pun intended) explosion of technology.

Under the ‘Training’ category listed in your post, you shift gears to the example of video-games. While I recognize the tremendous possibilities that integrated video-games represent for training, I do find it curious that the DOD has yet to cultivate the same interest in other forms of social media, such as blogging, wikis, and video sharing. The categorical summaries and the links you provide (particularly the ‘Milblogs in the news’ link) depict that the DOD’s outlook on blogging and/or wikis is merely from a public relations standpoint.

It is easy to understand why the DOD subscribes to the public relations’ point-of-view. The majority of ‘military’ blogs available by conducting a common websearch are highly subjective, emotional journal entries that relate personal experience through storytelling. These kinds of blogs are, as should be expected, high security risks because they are posted in public forums and often reveal critical information concerning troop movements, operations planning, and troop morale.

Were personnel introduced to the blogosphere in a formalized training setting and then given comprehensive intranet toolkits, I believe that these forms of social media would have far greater impact on mission outcome than video games, the later merely training prerequisite skills as opposed to the realtime and intelligence-based communications blogs and wikis supply. Blog communities would give commanders the opportunity to change training and combat procedures at critical moments.

With or without the DOD, I have found that soldiers and commanders do recognize the value of this information-sharing medium. One group of officers formed a grass-roots community at http://companycommand.army.mil/ to facilitate professional information sharing. Another, more formalized, information sharing program called CAVNET has had several recorded success stories in which information passed through the system prevented enemy endeavors.

There are also online communities in the works for use through Army Knowledge Online- the Army’s official personnel intranet service. So far though, the security measures for logging into ‘AKO’ (as it is called) are so rigid would-be users are deterred away. And that doesn’t even get into the interface, software, and load-time issues AKO is traditionally associated with.

So if these mediums have invaluable uses, why is there not more excitement within the military industry to use these outlets? Have there been any field studies into the use of such tools? Aside from operational security issues, what criticisms do DOD and high-ranking military personnel have of social media?

My comment on ‘Jesserwilson’s Weblog’ post entitled “Clearing up Misperceptions of Intellipedia.”

I know I’m entering the forum a little late, but I found myself enthralled by this post. I’d like to join the chorus of praise for the well chosen “We have a command chain, but not an information chain,” quote. This potent remark from a General candidly expresses the theme inherent to all training problems: lack of information fluidity.

Because information breakdown is an obvious and well-known problem to all military members, I am surprised to learn that there is so much resistance to changes that could drastically improve both training and operations. Were it simply a matter of operations security issues, I would have some sympathy, but the way you portray the issue suggests that the real problem is one of military culture (as is evident in your opening story about General Cartwright’s experience with open blogging).

In regards to the ‘seniors won’t use it’ argument, I think that there is some measure of truth in that criticism when applied to the general military population (not military personnel with high tech or extremely computer-oriented jobs), however, as more and more senior positions are taken over by new blood that problem will eventually fade away. I think your opening paragraph summarizes the solution to this problem best, “As hard as it is to imagine (I’m in my mid-twenties), there was a time when there were no word processors to type reports, or email to send messages. Information was typed and distributed hard copy.”

Finally, I’d like to comment on the 3rd criticism you discuss, the perpetuation of bad information. This is completely my opinion, but my experience has taught me that military personnel, as part of their culture, love to criticize and analyze. I would believe it more likely that wikis would end the perpetuation of bad information rather than facilitate it.

Since Intellipedia’s inception in 2006, have there been any notable situations that could be used to make or break the case for the use of wikis in military operations? I understand that your emphasis is on the professional intelligence community, but I am curious as to whether or not you have happened across any interesting bits of ‘intelligence’ that would suggest any interest on behalf of the military to use blogs and/or wikis for general professional discourse.

Silent Casualties: discussion on soldier suicide and prevention training

Overshadowed by endless reports of suicide bombers, insurgent uprisings, terrorist threats and roadside IED detonations, there is a frighteningly telling drift in soldier fatalities on the rise. The Army's most recent Suicide Event Report documents a soldier suicide rate higher than has been recorded in nearly 26 years. Perhaps even more suggestive, the numbers appear to have grown increasingly since the start of major combat operations in 2002.

Both the media and Army Public Relations outlets are careful to denote that the current suicide rate is still slightly lower than that of the contemporary civilian population. This they do without questioning data collection methods. In one of the many human-interest stories available, a family member of the casualty in question reported that although her husband's death was listed as 'non-hostile' the chaplain assigned to the case told her that it had in fact been a suicide.

It is impossible to determine whether or not this particular case was inaccurately reported, but this story raises an interesting suspicion. The actual suicide rates could be much higher if commanders and chaplains are practicing 'diplomatic' death reporting in order to preserve their soldier's honor and/or the death benefits that would be lost to his or her family members were the fatality reported as a suicide.

Concerns about the Army's suicide rate appear in media outlets as early as 2003 and in the familial stories that speckle search inquiries. The media reports casually mention the suicide issue in small bylines that list the facts and end without explanation or argument. These stories appear with the express purpose of perpetuating a general mood within the media about current operations thereby generating greater readership for the aforementioned outlet. These bylines make no studious attempt in examining current prevention practices, availability of resources, or delve beyond the surface of the mechanisms already at work in addressing the problem.

One of the major overhauls currently underway is being lead by Colonel (Dr.) Loree Sutton who is pictured on the left. Col. Sutton has been tasked with establishing a new Defense Department office that will focus on psychology, psychiatry, and brain trauma. Fred Baker, a reporter for the American Forces Press Service comments, "The hopes are that the center becomes the leading international resource for all psychological health and brain injury education, training, research, treatment and prevention."

Key senior leaders are aware of and actively addressing suicide. Though high tech, private, and imaginative programs like militaryonesource have been created in recent years there still appears to be a broken link in communication and training between the desks of major power positions held by visionaries like Col. Sutton and her contemporary Col. Elspeth Ritchie who is the psychiatric consultant to the Army and the ranks of average soldiers.

When asked in a random sample poll, 3rd and 4th year ROTC cadets (who will soon become Platoon Leaders in charge of the training and welfare of up to 50 troops) were surprised to learn that the Army even had suicide prevention programs. One cadet even exposed the current stigmatic 'culture-of-war' climate that prevents a great deal of suicide preventative care by remarking that people who suffer from PTSD should "learn to suck it up."

Another cadet who served in the National Guard as an enlisted soldier and completed a tour of duty in Bosnia recalled that during training, soldiers who attempted suicide or claimed they felt suicidal were publicly punished. These soldiers were forced to either wear their shirts inside out or walk around with a bright orange vest on so that they could be identified. Their bootlaces and belts were taken from them and they were returned to their units under the proviso that the soldier's immediate colleagues pull 24-hour guard duty over them.

Soldiers who have received suicide prevention training overwhelmingly reported a gratuitous use of PowerPoint Presentations. Though they are capable of transmitting large amounts of information to large audiences in a short period of time, these presentations are impersonal and dehumanizing. Soldiers complain that the constant exposure to this method desensitizes them from the importance of the information being disseminated.

Presentations are customarily conducted at the platoon or company level by unit NCO's and Junior Officers assigned with an 'additional duty.' This method groups soldiers together with colleagues who know and depend upon each other and is mediated by someone that may or may not have the prerequisite skills and training to conduct such a session. The failure in providing some means of anonymity reduces the likelihood that a soldier in need of treatment will speak up.

One aspect of suicide prevention practices that most soldiers seem to feel they are well informed about and prepared to use without fear of stigma or reprisal is internet services and '1-800' number resources. These services could link soldiers to local crisis centers where they could get immediate personal assistance. In addition to crisis management, these facilities offer programs such as marriage, financial, and job counseling. The preventative effort here targets the issues that may trigger suicidal thoughts and depression rather than merely practice reactive training.

That many people are concerned and working toward providing soldiers with adequate opportunities, treatment, and care should go without saying. The military and the Department of Defense with the blessing and backing of the federal government are addressing the problem in new and innovative ways. That being said, it is imperative to mission success that the bridges between the changes taking place at defense department and command levels trickle down.

If Army commanders want to see a reduction in suicide rates (and therefore benefit from the collectively improved cohesion and morale) they must face the reality that prevention training needs to start earlier in soldiers' careers and work from the bottom 'buddy' levels up. Platoon Leaders, Platoon Sergeants, and Squad Leaders should be given more training and required to assess and report not only on their subordinates' performance but on their morale as well.

It is time for a wake up call. Our Army has prided itself on its adaptability and flexibility. No matter how much we train, we cannot always escape those roadside explosions or predict every deadly ambush. We can, however, recognize and prevent suicide. These silenced casualties are not only victims of war- they are victims of neglect and their deaths are the direct result of failed training practices and access to available resources.