M4 vs. HK416: Small Arms Decisions for the Army

This blog’s primary focus is to discuss training methods and tempos. I am going to veer every-so-slightly from that course this post because I want to talk about a very alarming equipment debate. According to The Army Times, the Army has withdrawn its decision to let special units, particularly the Asymmetric Warfare Group, continue to use the HK416 in place of the M4. So while CNN continues to report American casualties in Iraq with all the sincerity and eloquence of a sportscaster during a football game, another newsworthy battle rages on for the soldiers on the front lines. Special Units’ soldiers, weapons experts, and weapons manufacturers have all argued in favor of the HK416 because of its superior performance in laboratory and field tests and also for its low maintenance needs and longevity. If it is indeed a superior weapon to the M16 family, why then, are our soldiers still being equipped with M4s and M16s?

The M16 was first introduced into the ranks at the dawn of the Vietnam War. It, and its descendants (the M16A2 and the M4), are gas-operated. Of the M4 The Army Times explains, “The M4’s collapsible stock and shortened barrel make it ideal for soldiers operating in vehicles and in urban combat. It is accurate and easy to shoot. But like the M16, the gas system blows carbon into the receiver, so the M4 requires frequent cleaning to prevent jamming.” Like the Vietnam-era soldier pictured above and to the left, soldiers in the field today find themselves following in their forefather’s footsteps–scraping carbon away and praying their weapons do not jam when it really counts. In addition to maintenance issues, Defense News reports, “The M4 suffered more stoppages than the combined number of jams by the three other competitors - Heckler & Koch XM8, FNH USA's Special Operations Forces Combat Assault Rifle (SCAR) and the H&K 416,” during tests conducted in November of 2007. Apparently, the HK416 has only one major downside according to field testers- the weight. It outweighs the M4 by about 1.5lbs. That small set back should not limit consideration of the weapon for common use by the Army if they carefully consider its many superior attributes. For a full and illustrated explanation of the differences in operation between the M4 and the HK416 click here.

Soldiers are not only entitled to great training, they deserve the best available equipment to perform their jobs. Ideally, our troops can get in, accomplish the mission, and get out in one piece. It is to that end that the HK416’s shunned performance is baffling. When the weapon was banned for the Asymmetric Warfare Group, soldiers protested immediately. Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., who has personally taken up a crusade for the use of the HK416, told reporters, “They [senior sergeants in the unit] were outraged. It’s a reduction in capability. It’s a waste of money that was already spent, and it makes the job more difficult since [the M4] is much more maintenance-intensive.”At this point in the argument, I must take the time to confess that I have no hard evidence with which to back the following conjecture (which is probably more accurately described as an accusation). Though I cannot make a solid argument for this, it is my sense that the articles mentioned above, flirt with the idea that the real reason the Army continues to turn a blind eye to test results and soldiers’ opinions about the M4 and the HK416 (pictured at right) may be because there exist some arrangements of interest between them (the Army) and the M16 family’s manufacturer Colt Defense. The logistical argument could even delve as deep as ammunitions contracts and war-stocks which both have dedicated financial resources ear-marked years in advance. This would mean that any change in weaponry would require a complete restructuring of other logistical arrangements.

During a $12 billion a month war campaign, it seems ridiculous to cut corners such as these. Money should not be the driving influence behind the decision to use the M4 carbine. Better-equipped soldiers complete missions with higher success rates and higher success rates mean lower over-all costs. That argument stands strong without even taking commitment to the safety of our soldiers and plain old-fashioned morality into account. This conflict between the logistical means of waging war and the societal obligations of providing our soldiers with the best opportunity of survival reveals a deeply concerning trend occurring within the bureaucratic faculties at work behind the scenes of military decision making.