I'm a Steam Roller: And My Linkroll Rolls On

Keeping with the theme of creating a thoughtful and insightful Weblog that can be used for its repository of resources and information in addition to blog posts, I have chosen to review and add ten more useful websites to my linkroll (located to the right). As always, when considering a website's validity and overall effectiveness, I apply the Webby Awards criteria to my assessment. Having said that, I must now concede that none of the sites added this week can harbor any hopes of actually winning the Webby Awards. That, however, does not mean that these sites are entirely without value. Indeed, they host a wealth of content that, for the right person, is invaluable. Though they all fail in visual design, interactivity and navigation, most (by virtue of the information they catalogue) provide insight into the needs of soldiers and the training methods the Army is adopting in order to meet those needs. Sites such as The Army Study Guide, Army Counseling Online, and the gem of my linkroll; The Center for Army Lessons Learned, provide users with a plethora of resources that can be used for learning anything from calling cadence to reacting to roadside bombs. The official military websites included were, perhaps, the worst sites for visual design and navigation but (provided that they functioned and did not have security locks) had the most authoritative information. The United States Army Accessions Command includes links to all entry level training programs. Contained within this site were documents relating to just about every detail of upcoming schools. (These included guidebooks, field manuals, training calendars, regulations, and packing lists). For soldiers and researchers interested in the Army's overseas activities beyond the War on Terror, the United States Army, Europe & 7th Army's website housed a repertoire of news articles and command releases depicting American training, European training, and international combined training operations. For those who want to see more scholastic compendiums of training research, the Combined Arms Research Library and the U.S. Army Center of Military History were extremely helpful sites. They both presented reasonably searchable directories and (mostly) working links to military documents and files. One of the more interesting attributes I discovered within the Research Library was a table listing of the physical location (by address and sometimes shelf number) of old military documents that have not been archived electronically. Finally, my additions this week include a few sites that are a little on the frivolous side but still informative. The National Defense Magazine and the Soldiers Magazine websites are the e-based siblings to paper publications and Ranger Joe's is a civilian company that provides military and law enforcement personal with a catalogue of equipment that is not ordinarily available or issued to personnel. In spite of the design quality these sites are a treasure chest, but don't take my word for it- scroll down and make a few clicks!

M4 vs. HK416: Small Arms Decisions for the Army

This blog’s primary focus is to discuss training methods and tempos. I am going to veer every-so-slightly from that course this post because I want to talk about a very alarming equipment debate. According to The Army Times, the Army has withdrawn its decision to let special units, particularly the Asymmetric Warfare Group, continue to use the HK416 in place of the M4. So while CNN continues to report American casualties in Iraq with all the sincerity and eloquence of a sportscaster during a football game, another newsworthy battle rages on for the soldiers on the front lines. Special Units’ soldiers, weapons experts, and weapons manufacturers have all argued in favor of the HK416 because of its superior performance in laboratory and field tests and also for its low maintenance needs and longevity. If it is indeed a superior weapon to the M16 family, why then, are our soldiers still being equipped with M4s and M16s?

The M16 was first introduced into the ranks at the dawn of the Vietnam War. It, and its descendants (the M16A2 and the M4), are gas-operated. Of the M4 The Army Times explains, “The M4’s collapsible stock and shortened barrel make it ideal for soldiers operating in vehicles and in urban combat. It is accurate and easy to shoot. But like the M16, the gas system blows carbon into the receiver, so the M4 requires frequent cleaning to prevent jamming.” Like the Vietnam-era soldier pictured above and to the left, soldiers in the field today find themselves following in their forefather’s footsteps–scraping carbon away and praying their weapons do not jam when it really counts. In addition to maintenance issues, Defense News reports, “The M4 suffered more stoppages than the combined number of jams by the three other competitors - Heckler & Koch XM8, FNH USA's Special Operations Forces Combat Assault Rifle (SCAR) and the H&K 416,” during tests conducted in November of 2007. Apparently, the HK416 has only one major downside according to field testers- the weight. It outweighs the M4 by about 1.5lbs. That small set back should not limit consideration of the weapon for common use by the Army if they carefully consider its many superior attributes. For a full and illustrated explanation of the differences in operation between the M4 and the HK416 click here.

Soldiers are not only entitled to great training, they deserve the best available equipment to perform their jobs. Ideally, our troops can get in, accomplish the mission, and get out in one piece. It is to that end that the HK416’s shunned performance is baffling. When the weapon was banned for the Asymmetric Warfare Group, soldiers protested immediately. Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., who has personally taken up a crusade for the use of the HK416, told reporters, “They [senior sergeants in the unit] were outraged. It’s a reduction in capability. It’s a waste of money that was already spent, and it makes the job more difficult since [the M4] is much more maintenance-intensive.”At this point in the argument, I must take the time to confess that I have no hard evidence with which to back the following conjecture (which is probably more accurately described as an accusation). Though I cannot make a solid argument for this, it is my sense that the articles mentioned above, flirt with the idea that the real reason the Army continues to turn a blind eye to test results and soldiers’ opinions about the M4 and the HK416 (pictured at right) may be because there exist some arrangements of interest between them (the Army) and the M16 family’s manufacturer Colt Defense. The logistical argument could even delve as deep as ammunitions contracts and war-stocks which both have dedicated financial resources ear-marked years in advance. This would mean that any change in weaponry would require a complete restructuring of other logistical arrangements.

During a $12 billion a month war campaign, it seems ridiculous to cut corners such as these. Money should not be the driving influence behind the decision to use the M4 carbine. Better-equipped soldiers complete missions with higher success rates and higher success rates mean lower over-all costs. That argument stands strong without even taking commitment to the safety of our soldiers and plain old-fashioned morality into account. This conflict between the logistical means of waging war and the societal obligations of providing our soldiers with the best opportunity of survival reveals a deeply concerning trend occurring within the bureaucratic faculties at work behind the scenes of military decision making.

Getting a Good Site Picture: Military Websites of Interest

In my virtual journeys this week, I traversed the Internet looking at various websites I hoped to use in order to beef-up my existing linkroll. Using Webby and IMSA criteria, I examined several dozen websites and have chosen ten of high design and/or information quality relating to military training and added them to my list (which is located below and to the right). The sites, discussed below, can be visited by clicking on their title in the linkroll.

Generally, I found that most sites dedicated to military training fell into roughly four main categories:

The first is mostly comprised of sites that have poor design quality and very questionable authority. Though some of these sites provided (what can be called) intriguing information, I choose not to list them because of their excessive lack of authority.

The second category is made up of sites that boast valuable information and link collections but, as is an historical issue with military websites, have poor design quality. Sites such as ‘The RMA Debate,’ which is a repository of argumentative essays and reports by people of varying authority, belong in this category. ‘Defense Update,’ a site with international RSS feeds, also falls under this unfortunate description.

Perhaps the most authoritative collection of military training websites is a compilation of sites targeted specifically toward professionals and academics. These sites boast higher quality design and the utmost in authority. The ‘U.S. Army War College’ is the main hub to sites such as ‘The U.S. Army War College Quarterly Journal,’ and the ‘Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College.’ The later provides visitors access to downloads of academic studies in every imaginable facet of military operations and training.

The fourth and final category is composed of sites that are professional in design (most likely these sites are designed and operated by professional third party web-design companies) and are aimed primarily at general employees. These sites’ main priority is news circulation though many also double as employee interaction forums. ‘Military.com’ not only provides news items, it provides links to services military members may find valuable and this site has a collection of discussion forums and blogs. ‘Stars and Stripes,’ ‘Military Times,’ ‘The Army Times,’ and ‘Defense News’ are all web-based versions of print news. Though all of these sites can boast superior design quality, each receives their news feeds from different sources. ‘Stars and Stripes’ is generally a collection of articles written by both their own staff writers and professional reporters from media outlets worldwide and is distributed to deployed American troops. The later three sites are produced exclusively as employee newsletters and often contain information such as promotion details, pay charts, and benefit updates.

Virtual Explosion: warfare, intelligence, and operational security concerns over the blogosphere

Arguably, the greatest challenge that any global corporation with a 1-million person interchangeable and mobile workforce operating in a highly volatile market can face is that of communication. Throw in a rigid hierarchical culture and an uncompromising need for security and secrecy and you get the problems faced by all military members.

Indeed, it was these security and secrecy issues that made me hesitant to even begin this blog. Given that these concerns are still so evident within the online military community, I was not surprised to find very little training discussions taking place in public forums. Most of the easily available 'military' blogs, similar to the one pictured to the left, are highly-charged emotional journals belonging to deployed service members.

Thus was the status-quo when I dawned my virtual battle-rattle and trekked into the blogosphere looking for valid training discussions. Ironically, I discovered that one of the loudest and continuous debates going on in the military blogosphere is about the use of that same blogosphere (call it social media, web 2.0 or whatever seems most appropriate) in military training, public relations, and operations. Currently, there are only a few web 2.0 communities within the internet designed for professional military members to discuss operations and training issues. Pictured further below is a website originally founded by 4 West Point graduates. It is designed with the intent of providing company commanders (leaders of 200-300 man elements) a forum in which they can share experiences and advice.

Though I read through many, many blogs, I chose to comment on two. (These comments are posted below for convenience, but can also be read on the blogs themselves by clicking here and here).

The first blog, Intel 2.o, is the official blog for a social media research company. As far as I can tell, it is authored by the company founder Guy Hagen. Both Mr. Hagen and his company boast impressive credentials. I chose this blog for its level of professionalism and expertise as well as the fact that it was vague enough to cultivate questions.

The second blog I chose to comment on is from a less reputable, though still valid and intriguing, source. The author of 'Jesserwilson's Weblog' claims to be a dedicated government employee in his mid-twenties. Though he lacks viable credentials, he links his posts to good resources and demonstrates a high quality of language, rhetoric, and subject matter knowledge within his posts. I chose to comment on this blog because his arguments were professional and, as such, invited open and friendly debate.

My comment on Intel 2.0 post entitled "Military Social Media Intelligence."

First of all, I’d like to compliment not only the content of this blog but also extend admiration of the scope and depth of the services Innovation Insight provides. I am a student at the University of Southern California and am in the process of composing a blog dedicated solely to the discussion of contemporary trends in military training. Your blog interests me because it touches on some major concerns that have resulted out of both the current war as well as the virtual (no pun intended) explosion of technology.

Under the ‘Training’ category listed in your post, you shift gears to the example of video-games. While I recognize the tremendous possibilities that integrated video-games represent for training, I do find it curious that the DOD has yet to cultivate the same interest in other forms of social media, such as blogging, wikis, and video sharing. The categorical summaries and the links you provide (particularly the ‘Milblogs in the news’ link) depict that the DOD’s outlook on blogging and/or wikis is merely from a public relations standpoint.

It is easy to understand why the DOD subscribes to the public relations’ point-of-view. The majority of ‘military’ blogs available by conducting a common websearch are highly subjective, emotional journal entries that relate personal experience through storytelling. These kinds of blogs are, as should be expected, high security risks because they are posted in public forums and often reveal critical information concerning troop movements, operations planning, and troop morale.

Were personnel introduced to the blogosphere in a formalized training setting and then given comprehensive intranet toolkits, I believe that these forms of social media would have far greater impact on mission outcome than video games, the later merely training prerequisite skills as opposed to the realtime and intelligence-based communications blogs and wikis supply. Blog communities would give commanders the opportunity to change training and combat procedures at critical moments.

With or without the DOD, I have found that soldiers and commanders do recognize the value of this information-sharing medium. One group of officers formed a grass-roots community at http://companycommand.army.mil/ to facilitate professional information sharing. Another, more formalized, information sharing program called CAVNET has had several recorded success stories in which information passed through the system prevented enemy endeavors.

There are also online communities in the works for use through Army Knowledge Online- the Army’s official personnel intranet service. So far though, the security measures for logging into ‘AKO’ (as it is called) are so rigid would-be users are deterred away. And that doesn’t even get into the interface, software, and load-time issues AKO is traditionally associated with.

So if these mediums have invaluable uses, why is there not more excitement within the military industry to use these outlets? Have there been any field studies into the use of such tools? Aside from operational security issues, what criticisms do DOD and high-ranking military personnel have of social media?

My comment on ‘Jesserwilson’s Weblog’ post entitled “Clearing up Misperceptions of Intellipedia.”

I know I’m entering the forum a little late, but I found myself enthralled by this post. I’d like to join the chorus of praise for the well chosen “We have a command chain, but not an information chain,” quote. This potent remark from a General candidly expresses the theme inherent to all training problems: lack of information fluidity.

Because information breakdown is an obvious and well-known problem to all military members, I am surprised to learn that there is so much resistance to changes that could drastically improve both training and operations. Were it simply a matter of operations security issues, I would have some sympathy, but the way you portray the issue suggests that the real problem is one of military culture (as is evident in your opening story about General Cartwright’s experience with open blogging).

In regards to the ‘seniors won’t use it’ argument, I think that there is some measure of truth in that criticism when applied to the general military population (not military personnel with high tech or extremely computer-oriented jobs), however, as more and more senior positions are taken over by new blood that problem will eventually fade away. I think your opening paragraph summarizes the solution to this problem best, “As hard as it is to imagine (I’m in my mid-twenties), there was a time when there were no word processors to type reports, or email to send messages. Information was typed and distributed hard copy.”

Finally, I’d like to comment on the 3rd criticism you discuss, the perpetuation of bad information. This is completely my opinion, but my experience has taught me that military personnel, as part of their culture, love to criticize and analyze. I would believe it more likely that wikis would end the perpetuation of bad information rather than facilitate it.

Since Intellipedia’s inception in 2006, have there been any notable situations that could be used to make or break the case for the use of wikis in military operations? I understand that your emphasis is on the professional intelligence community, but I am curious as to whether or not you have happened across any interesting bits of ‘intelligence’ that would suggest any interest on behalf of the military to use blogs and/or wikis for general professional discourse.

Silent Casualties: discussion on soldier suicide and prevention training

Overshadowed by endless reports of suicide bombers, insurgent uprisings, terrorist threats and roadside IED detonations, there is a frighteningly telling drift in soldier fatalities on the rise. The Army's most recent Suicide Event Report documents a soldier suicide rate higher than has been recorded in nearly 26 years. Perhaps even more suggestive, the numbers appear to have grown increasingly since the start of major combat operations in 2002.

Both the media and Army Public Relations outlets are careful to denote that the current suicide rate is still slightly lower than that of the contemporary civilian population. This they do without questioning data collection methods. In one of the many human-interest stories available, a family member of the casualty in question reported that although her husband's death was listed as 'non-hostile' the chaplain assigned to the case told her that it had in fact been a suicide.

It is impossible to determine whether or not this particular case was inaccurately reported, but this story raises an interesting suspicion. The actual suicide rates could be much higher if commanders and chaplains are practicing 'diplomatic' death reporting in order to preserve their soldier's honor and/or the death benefits that would be lost to his or her family members were the fatality reported as a suicide.

Concerns about the Army's suicide rate appear in media outlets as early as 2003 and in the familial stories that speckle search inquiries. The media reports casually mention the suicide issue in small bylines that list the facts and end without explanation or argument. These stories appear with the express purpose of perpetuating a general mood within the media about current operations thereby generating greater readership for the aforementioned outlet. These bylines make no studious attempt in examining current prevention practices, availability of resources, or delve beyond the surface of the mechanisms already at work in addressing the problem.

One of the major overhauls currently underway is being lead by Colonel (Dr.) Loree Sutton who is pictured on the left. Col. Sutton has been tasked with establishing a new Defense Department office that will focus on psychology, psychiatry, and brain trauma. Fred Baker, a reporter for the American Forces Press Service comments, "The hopes are that the center becomes the leading international resource for all psychological health and brain injury education, training, research, treatment and prevention."

Key senior leaders are aware of and actively addressing suicide. Though high tech, private, and imaginative programs like militaryonesource have been created in recent years there still appears to be a broken link in communication and training between the desks of major power positions held by visionaries like Col. Sutton and her contemporary Col. Elspeth Ritchie who is the psychiatric consultant to the Army and the ranks of average soldiers.

When asked in a random sample poll, 3rd and 4th year ROTC cadets (who will soon become Platoon Leaders in charge of the training and welfare of up to 50 troops) were surprised to learn that the Army even had suicide prevention programs. One cadet even exposed the current stigmatic 'culture-of-war' climate that prevents a great deal of suicide preventative care by remarking that people who suffer from PTSD should "learn to suck it up."

Another cadet who served in the National Guard as an enlisted soldier and completed a tour of duty in Bosnia recalled that during training, soldiers who attempted suicide or claimed they felt suicidal were publicly punished. These soldiers were forced to either wear their shirts inside out or walk around with a bright orange vest on so that they could be identified. Their bootlaces and belts were taken from them and they were returned to their units under the proviso that the soldier's immediate colleagues pull 24-hour guard duty over them.

Soldiers who have received suicide prevention training overwhelmingly reported a gratuitous use of PowerPoint Presentations. Though they are capable of transmitting large amounts of information to large audiences in a short period of time, these presentations are impersonal and dehumanizing. Soldiers complain that the constant exposure to this method desensitizes them from the importance of the information being disseminated.

Presentations are customarily conducted at the platoon or company level by unit NCO's and Junior Officers assigned with an 'additional duty.' This method groups soldiers together with colleagues who know and depend upon each other and is mediated by someone that may or may not have the prerequisite skills and training to conduct such a session. The failure in providing some means of anonymity reduces the likelihood that a soldier in need of treatment will speak up.

One aspect of suicide prevention practices that most soldiers seem to feel they are well informed about and prepared to use without fear of stigma or reprisal is internet services and '1-800' number resources. These services could link soldiers to local crisis centers where they could get immediate personal assistance. In addition to crisis management, these facilities offer programs such as marriage, financial, and job counseling. The preventative effort here targets the issues that may trigger suicidal thoughts and depression rather than merely practice reactive training.

That many people are concerned and working toward providing soldiers with adequate opportunities, treatment, and care should go without saying. The military and the Department of Defense with the blessing and backing of the federal government are addressing the problem in new and innovative ways. That being said, it is imperative to mission success that the bridges between the changes taking place at defense department and command levels trickle down.

If Army commanders want to see a reduction in suicide rates (and therefore benefit from the collectively improved cohesion and morale) they must face the reality that prevention training needs to start earlier in soldiers' careers and work from the bottom 'buddy' levels up. Platoon Leaders, Platoon Sergeants, and Squad Leaders should be given more training and required to assess and report not only on their subordinates' performance but on their morale as well.

It is time for a wake up call. Our Army has prided itself on its adaptability and flexibility. No matter how much we train, we cannot always escape those roadside explosions or predict every deadly ambush. We can, however, recognize and prevent suicide. These silenced casualties are not only victims of war- they are victims of neglect and their deaths are the direct result of failed training practices and access to available resources.